Battle of Prairie Grove (pt 1)
(Page 118) When the action at Cane Hill closed, General Blunt knew that the struggle for the possession of western Arkansas and southwest Missouri by the Confederate forces was not ended, for he had accurate information through his scouts and spies that General Hindman had collected and concentrated all the available Southern forces of Arkansas and the Indian Territory in the vicinity of Fort Smith and Van Buren, estimated at 25,000 men, to carry the campaign into Missouri.
Determined to hold all that he had gained in the operations at Cane Hill, General Blunt ordered up his trains and the balance of his troops and artillery encamped at Lindsay’s Prairie, and on their arrival, had part of the command and part of the trains go into camp at Rhea’s Mills, and the balance at Cane Hill, eight miles south, and at once commenced collecting subsistence for his men and forage for his animals. Between Fayetteville and Cane Hill was the finest agricultural section in northwestern Arkansas, and most of the farms had raised on them that season good crops of corn, oats, wheat, potatoes and apples.
The possession of this fair valley, lying directly north of the Boston Mountains, had been won by the Federal forces after a short, sharp contest; but to hold it General Blunt became convinced that he would in a very short time be obliged to engage in a fierce struggle, for his troops had hardly pitched their tents in their new camps, when his scouts brought him information that General Hindman’s army had crossed the Arkansas River at Van Buren and advanced north fifteen miles, until General Marmaduke’s retreating division was met on Lee’s Creek.
A decision of the belligerent forces was near at hand. Having made extensive preparations for the campaign, (Page 119) General Hindman, on meeting General Marmaduke, deter mined to move north rapidly with his entire army and attack, if possible, overwhelm General Blunt before his reinforcements could reach him, which he and his Generals believed to be practicable. Convinced by information in his possession that General Hindman, with an army fully twenty thousand strong, was advancing to attack him, General Blunt, immediately after the action of Cane Hill, advised General Curtis, the Department Commander, St. Louis, of the situation by telegraph from Elkhorn, on the Telegraph Road, and requested him to order the Second and Third Divisions of the Army of the Frontier, then en camped at Wilson Creek, ten miles southwest of Spring field, to move forward by forced marches to reinforce him. On receipt of this dispatch, General Curtis, by telegraph, ordered General F. J. Herron, commanding the two divisions, to push forward with them as rapidly as practicable to the assistance of General Blunt. General Herron received General Curtis telegraphic order at eight o clock on the morning of December 3rd, and by twelve o clock that day his troops were in motion and on the march in the direction of Fayetteville.
His promptness in the movement was characteristic of his soldierly bearing. From Wilson Creek, Missouri, to Fayetteville, Arkansas, the point to which he would be obliged to march on the Telegraph Road, was one hundred miles, and Rhea’s Mills, where part of General Blunt’s troops were encamped, was sixteen miles southwest. This was a long distance for infantry to be put on forced marches, and would tax their power of endurance to the utmost limit. The Springfield and Fayetteville road, known also as the Wire or Telegraph Road, was the nearest practicable route by which General Blunt could be reached.
This road was in splendid condition on the eve of the march, for it had not been much used by large armies and their trains passing over it since the battle of Pea Ridge, in March. (Page 120) Without any delay General Herron sent General Blunt a dispatch stating that he would make the best time possi ble on the march, and keep him constantly advised of his position en route.
That there might be no delay, his baggage trains followed in the rear of each division, and carried the knap-sacks of his men, thus relieving them of a burden that would have been much felt in the long march before them, had they been obliged to carry them on their backs. General Herron arrived at Elkhorn with the cavalry of the Second Division on the evening of December 5th. Here he received an order from General Blunt to send forward all the cavalry he could spare. He ordered forward Colonel Dudley Wickersham with the Tenth Illinois, First Iowa, a battalion of the Second Wisconsin, and Colonel Geiger’s Eighth Missouri Cavalry, to report to General Blunt by forced marches. General Herron stayed all night at Elk-horn waiting for his infantry and artillery to come up. He moved forward the next day to Cross Hollow, fifteen miles, and halted again for his troops to close up. Colonel Daniel Huston, commanding the Second Division, arrived at Cross Hollow at seven o clock on the evening of December 6th, and rested until midnight and then resumed the march, arriving at Fayetteville the next morning at sun rise. General Herron, who had moved forward at the head of his troops, arrived at Fayetteville about three hours in advance of Colonel Huston’s Second Division.
While the Second and Third Divisions were thus moving to his assistance at the rate of thirty-five miles a day, General Blunt’s cavalry was busily employed in skirmishing with the Confederate advance and endeavoring to keep General Marmaduke’s cavalry from forcing the passes in the Boston Mountains.
He was determined to hold his positions at Cane Hill and Rhea’s Mills until the reinforcements of General Herron arrived. Frequent reconnaissance’s on all the roads that (Page 121) approached his position from the south or southeast to keep him in close touch with the movements of the Con federates, led him to believe that General Hindman was preparing to cross the mountain by taking either the Tele graph Road, which passed about ten miles east of his position on Cane Hill, or by taking the Cove Creek road, which forked on the mountain, the left-hand fork of which led directly to Cane Hill, and the right to Fayetteville.
From the point where this road forked to General Blunt’s position on Cane Hill was about six miles. The Fayetteville branch of the Cove Creek road was crossed one and two miles north of the point where it united with the Cane Hill branch, by two roads running west and south west from the Telegraph Road to the Newburg and Cane Hill road. General Blunt saw the importance of keeping a strong outpost at the junction of the Cane Hill road with the Fayetteville and Cove Creek road, and at the crossings of the other roads referred to. He saw that if General Hindman was allowed to advance on the Cove Creek road to the point where it forked, he could, by making a strong feint, threaten a direct attack on Cane Hill, while his main army moved north on the Fayetteville road to turn the Union left flank.
On the 4th, General Blunt strengthened his outposts in the mountains and sent forward a cavalry reconnaissance on the Cove Creek road in the direction of Van Buren to ascertain if the enemy were advancing in force. The reconnaissance met the Confederate advance under Colonel Shelby, and after a slight skirmish fell back to the outpost on the mountain. The next morning Colonel Shelby threw forward a regiment and attacked the outpost, but his force was soon repulsed and driven back several miles through the mountains. Anticipating another attack upon this outpost, General Blunt on the night of the 5th directed Colonel Cloud, commanding the Third Brigade, to strengthen it by daybreak the next morning with one (Page 122) hundred cavalry and two mountain howitzers. In the meantime, Colonel Shelby advanced up the Cove Creek road with a brigade of cavalry and encamped that night within a mile or so of the Federal outpost, and the next morning at daylight dismounted part of his command, made another attack, and before Colonel Cloud’s support arrived, forced the detachment of the Second Kansas at the station to fall back about three miles in the direction of Cane Hill. Colonel Emmett McDonald, who had crossed over the mountains on the Telegraph Road with a brigade of Missouri Confederate cavalry, joined Colonel Shelby shortly after he had driven in the Federal picket.
Immediately after taking possession of the Fayetteville branch of the Cove Creek road, General Marmaduke advanced the brigades of Colonels Shelby, McDonald and Car roll to within three miles of General Blunt’s position on Cane Hill, where they came in sight of the Federal cavalry under Colonel Cloud drawn up in line of battle. The op posing forces consumed the day in maneuvering and skirmishing, each side sustaining a few casualties in wounded. While the Confederate cavalry were thus threatening General Blunt with an attack in front, General Hindman was bringing forward his infantry and artillery on the Cove Creek road. As General Marmaduke’s cavalry were now in possession of the Fayetteville branch of the Cove Creek road at its junction with the Cane Hill road, General Blunt was apprehensive that an effort would be made by the Confederate generals to turn his left flank so as to get between him and his reinforcements under General Herron. That he might be advised at once if there were any indications of such a movement in progress, on the morning of the 6th he ordered Colonel John M. Richardson, Fourteenth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, who had arrived from Cassville the night before, to take a force of one hundred mounted men and proceed east on the Hog-Eye road to the crossing of the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, and on (Page 123) arriving there to send part of his men south on it to ascertain if the enemy were advancing. On arriving at the inter section of the roads described, Colonel Richardson ordered Captain Julian with his company to take the advance, and proceed south on the road in the direction of Cove Creek. Captain Julian had not advanced more than two miles, when he captured three Southern soldiers and sent them back, and advancing again a short distance, came in sight of the camp of the Southern forces which he thought were at least two thousand men strong. The Colonel examined the prisoners and obtained from them the information that he was within a mile of the main Confederate army, which was moving up the mountain on the direct road to Cane Hill. He then fell back a mile or so and immediately sent messengers to report to General Blunt the presence of this large Confederate force within a few miles of his headquarters. The General could not feel certain whether the main Con federate force was being massed in his front to fight him early the next morning or whether the Confederate cavalry, with which his troops had been skirmishing during the day were concealing the real movements of the main force under General Hindman.
Knowing that the enemy were in force on the immediate Federal front and in view of the strong probability of a general engagement the next day, the men of Colonel Cloud’s Third Brigade were ordered to bivouac on their arms that night at the front just south of Newburg. At two o clock on the mornings of the 5th, 6th and 7th, the Federal troops at Cane Hill and Rhea’s Mills were ordered to strike tents and load up their baggage and camp equipage, and the mule teams were harnessed and hitched up, and the wagons stood ready until daylight to move at a moment’s notice.
In the midst of the preparations for the coming struggle General Blunt w r as much gratified to have Colonel Wickersham report to him about ten o clock on the night of the 6th with a brigade of cavalry, which General Herron had (Page 124) sent forward from Cross Hollow. He also received a dispatch from General Herron stating that he would reach Fayetteville by daylight Sunday morning, the 7th. Feeling that the impending conflict was at hand, shortly after mid night on the morning of the 7th, General Blunt again directed Colonel Richardson to proceed with his own battalion and Captain Conkey’s company, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, east on the Hog-Eye road to the crossing of the Fayetteville and Cove Creek road, to ascertain whether the Southern forces were moving in the direction of Fayetteville, and if they were to resist them to the last extremity and to promptly notify him of their movements. The Colonel moved forward with his detachment, but before reaching the intersection of the roads met Captain Coleman of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry, with thirty men who had just been driven from the junction of the roads by the enemy and who reported that the Confederates were advancing up the Cove Creek road in strong force.
Thinking that the Southern forces were advancing on Cane Hill, Colonel Richardson fell back about a mile and took up a strong position to resist them, and sent a messenger to report to General Blunt; but waiting for a short time and finding that the enemy were not advancing, he sent Captain Julian forward again with a small detachment to ascertain their movements.
The Captain soon discovered that the Confederate forces were marching in the direction of Fayetteville, and then hastily returned and reported, and General Blunt was promptly notified.
Acting on the information that the enemy were advancing on Cane Hill, General Blunt and staff at seven o clock left his headquarters and rode to the front, expect ing soon to open the battle. Although a considerable force of Confederate cavalry were yet on the mountain in his front, he soon received information that the main Southern army were marching northeast in the direction of (Page 125) Fayetteville, on the Cove Creek road, and had already passed the point where that road was intersected by the Hog-Eye road. He was much chagrined on receiving this information, and immediately ordered all his transportation to Rhea’s Mills, guarded by Colonel Phillips Third Indian Regiment, and directed Colonel Judson to take his regiment, the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and two howitzers, together with Colonel Richardson’s detachment, and proceed as rapidly as practicable on the Hog-Eye road, and if, on arriving there, the enemy had passed in the direction of Fayetteville, to follow them and attack them vigorously, which he did with good effect.
Colonel Wickersham was ordered to proceed at once with his brigade of cavalry on the Cane Hill and Fayetteville road in the direction of Fayetteville, to form a junction with General Herron, who was coming up with his forces. General Salomon commanding the First Brigade, was ordered to follow Colonel Wickersham, and the Second Brigade, under Colonel William Weer, and the Third Brigade under Colonel Cloud, were withdrawn from the front south of New-burg about nine o clock and directed to follow close in the rear of the first brigade. Time was an important element in the situation, and the moment General Blunt decided to make these movements he sent two mounted messenger parties with dispatches to notify General Herron, but failing to take the precaution to send them via Rhea’s Mills, they were cut off by General Marmaduke’s advance. Colonel Wickersham, who had moved in advance, instead of keeping on the direct road towards Fayetteville, about three miles north of Cane Hill, took a left hand road leading to Rhea’s Mills.
The infantry and artillery following the cavalry kept the same road until General Blunt rode forward and over took Colonel Wickersham and directed him to proceed in the direction of Fayetteville, and endeavor to open communication with General Herron, who had already engaged the enemy. General Salomon, with the First Brigade, was sent (Page 126) to Rhea’s Mills to guard the Federal trains, arriving there about twelve o clock. General Blunt then took the Second and Third Brigades and marched on an obscure country road in a northeast direction, a direction in which artillery firing had just been heard.
General Hindman had up to a late hour of the 6th, made all his preparations to fight General Blunt in his position on Cane Hill. His infantry and artillery had moved up, and were in position to make an attack on the Federal troops the next morning.
He had heard of the arrival of Colonel Wickersham’s cavalry brigade to reinforce General Blunt, but this information did not change his purpose to make the proposed at tack. On the night of the 6th, however, after his generals had assembled to receive their final instructions in regard to carrying into effect the movements decided upon, he received information that General Herron would reach Fayetteville that night with large reinforcements of infantry and artillery for General Blunt.
After some consideration he came to the conclusion that if he attacked General Blunt in front and forced him from his position, he would fall back until he met his reinforcements, after which he would probably assume the offensive. General Hindman, therefore, decided to abandon the pro posed attack on the Federal position at Cane Hill, to with draw his troops from their several positions, and to push them forward on the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, and attack the Federal column under General Herron, and if possible, crush it before General Blunt could come up to its assistance. To deceive General Blunt as long as possible in regard to this new movement, General Hindman left Colonel Monroe with a brigade of Arkansas cavalry on the crest of the mountain in front of the Federal position, with instructions to dismount his men at daylight and skirmish as infantry with the Federal troops, and detain them as long as possible, a clever stratagem by which he hoped to benefit largely. (Page 127)
In the next place orders were issued to brigade and division commanders of the Southern army, to have their troops in proper positions and in readiness to march at three o clock on Sunday morning, the 7th. But on account of some unavoidable detentions, the troops were not all in motion until nearly four o clock. The road was very rough, so that the artillery and infantry were obliged to move slowly. General Marmaduke’s cavalry division, consisting of Colonels Shelby’s and McDonald’s brigades, marched in the advance with a battery of light artillery.
Moving down the northern slope of the mountain, a distance of about eight miles northeast of Cane Hill, General Marmaduke’s advance came in sight at daylight of Colonel M. La Rue Harrison’s First Arkansas Union Cavalry, and detachments of the Sixth and Seventh Regiments, Missouri Cavalry, marching southwest on the Cane Hill road near its junction with the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road, to reinforce General Blunt. Colonel Harrison had been ordered forward from Elkhorn, and on the night of the 6th encamped on the Fayetteville and Cane Hill road near Illinois Creek. Major Bredett, commanding detachments of the Seventh and Sixth Missouri Cavalry, had marched nearly all night, and having no information that the enemy had flanked General Blunt, halted a few moments at daylight near the camp of the First Arkansas Cavalry, to feed and rest his tired and much-worn horses. Lieutenant L. Bunner had been marching with his company since two o clock in the morning about half a mile in advance of the other companies of the regiment, to guard against a surprise. In probably less than ten minutes after Major Bredett’s command had halted near the entrance to a lane to feed their horses, a company of the Eighth Missouri Cavalry, also on the march to Cane Hill, passed them and entering the lane, had got nearly through it, when a volley was fired into them by an unseen foe from the thick woods on their left front. The company instantly retreated, falling back (Page 128) through Major Bredett’s column. On hearing the firing the Major ordered his men to mount their horses and form in line to resist the enemy, who were seen approaching. He had scarcely formed his men in line when Colonel McDonald’s Confederate Cavalry Brigade rapidly advanced within range and commenced pouring such heavy volleys of musketry into his line from his left, front and rear that he was obliged to order the retreat sounded.
After retreating a short distance this gallant officer rallied and formed his men in line, but being pressed by a superior force from all sides, he was wounded and killed and his men dispersed and pursued, some of whom were wounded and captured.
Colonel McDonald, in crossing over from the Cove Creek and Fayetteville road to the Cane Hill road, got between Major Bredett and his advance guard under Lieutenant Bunner, and on hearing the firing in his rear, the Lieutenant turned back with his company to join his command, but had proceeded only a few hundred yards when he saw advancing directly in his front a full company wearing the Federal uniform. Supposing the company to belong to the First Arkansas Cavalry, he allowed them to approach within fifty yards, when they opened fire upon him. But still thinking they were Federal soldiers, he called out to them to cease firing, that We are friends.” In another instant he became satisfied that they were disguised enemies, and then with drew his company with the loss of one man severely wounded and five horses killed and wounded. The enemy who were wearing the Federal uniform proved to be Quantrill’s company of bandits, whose hands were reeking with the blood of murdered Union citizens of Missouri. After the fall of Major Bredett, his command dispersed in every direction, but the men of each company kept together, and rallied and fought when not pressed by greatly superior numbers. (Page 129)
Captain William McKee, in making a stand with his company, became surrounded and was killed while trying: to cut his way through the Confederate line. In their rapid movements, Colonels McDonald’s and Shelby’s brigades soon came up and attacked and routed the First Arkansas Union Cavalry, capturing all their wagons, baggage and camp equipage.
In pursuing the detachments of the Sixth and Seventh Regiments Missouri and First Arkansas Cavalry, the Con federate cavalry also became scattered, and it was at this time that a company of the Seventh Missouri Cavalry rallied and captured Colonel Shelby and two pieces of artillery. The Federal detachments, however, were unable to hold their prizes very long, for on returning from the pursuit of the main body of the Federal cavalry in the direction of Fayetteville, Lieutenant-Colonel M. L. Young, McDonald’s cavalry regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Crump, First Texas Cavalry Regiment Partisan Rangers, of Mc Donald’s cavalry brigade, recaptured Colonel Shelby and his battery.
After resting an hour at Fayetteville, General Herron, at four o clock, pushed on with such of his troops as had arrived, sending forward Major Hubbard with two companies of the First Missouri Cavalry as an advance guard. When about ten miles southwest of Fayetteville, he met the First Arkansas Cavalry and detachments of the Seventh Missouri Cavalry retreating in great disorder. He succeeded in rallying part of the retreating troops and ordering the fence of a field thrown down on the left hand side of the road, threw his two companies into line in a wheat field to check the enemy. The Confederate cavalry soon approached in large numbers within two hundred yards and filing off to the right and left of the road, commenced to flank him. Seeing that the Confederate force was too strong to con tend with, he was obliged to order a retreat, but having several fences to throw down, his command was much impeded in its movements. (Page 130)
The Confederate officers, seeing the situation, ordered a charge, and dashing upon the Federal cavalry, cut off and captured Major Hubbard and several of his men while trying to cross a fence. Captain A. L. Burrows then took command of the two companies and marched them rapidly in the direction of the mountain, a mile or so distant, and on arriving near its base fell in with some two hundred stragglers of the First Arkansas and Sixth and Seventh Regiments, Missouri Cavalry, and ordered them into line to make a stand to check the enemy who were still pursuing them. On seeing the Federal cavalry forming in line, the Confederate column soon came to a halt, and after some skirmishing commenced to fall back. In the meantime detachments of the First Arkansas and Seventh Missouri Cavalry, which had retreated on the Fayetteville road, met General Herron with his escort, consisting of one company of the First Missouri Cavalry, under Captain J. M. Adams, and after some threats and decided and drastic action, halted his retreating troops, and formed them in line. He saw that the situation required energetic action to save his command from possible disaster. He immediately ordered for ward two regiments of infantry and Captain Foust’s battery Missouri Light Artillery. When his infantry and artillery arrived at the front, General Marmaduke’s cavalry had approached in strong force and formed in line of battle to contest the Federal advance. With very little delay, General Herron examined and took in the situation and directed Captain Foust to open fire with his battery, using mostly shell, upon the enemy, and soon put them to flight, and pursued them four miles to the crossing of Illinois Creek. The course of the creek through the county is from southeast to northwest, but at the point where the Fayetteville road crosses it it flows nearly due west, and a short distance below the ford it changes its course and flows nearly due north for about one mile parallel with the road, when it again changes its course to the northwest. (Page 131)
On reaching the high ground just north of the creek, General Herron, looking over the fields and open spaces beyond it with his field glasses, discovered the Confederate army in position, occupying the high ridges covered with a thick growth of young timber and underbrush, about three-quarters of a mile south of the ford. On the left hand side of the road, for a distance of half a mile south of the creek, the ground was a high plateau covered with timber. South of this timber extending to the foot of the ridge on which the enemy were posted, there were several cultivated fields. On the right of the road from a short distance south of the creek to the foot of the ridge, there were several fields with intervening open ground.
Prairie Grove Church was two miles southwest of the crossing of Illinois Creek, near the junction of the Cane Hill with the Cove Creek and Fayetteville roads. The two hostile armies were now confronting each other and ready to engage in fierce conflict. After reviewing the situation for a moment, General Herron was satisfied that the Confederate army had passed General Blunt by turning his left flank. Though he was not advised of the strength of the Confederate army, he determined to attack it at once, hoping that the artillery firing would bring up and into action the Kansas General with his division. He crossed the creek with one of his staff and rode forward to place his infantry and artillery in position to open the battle. Inspired by the courage and devotion of their gallant leader, his artillery companies were bringing up his twenty guns at a gallop, and his foot-sore infantry were coming forward on the double-quick.
He desired to determine for himself suitable positions for his batteries and after a careful inspection of the ground in front, he ordered Lieutenant C. L. Edwards to cross the creek with a section of Foust’s battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, advance to the high ground on the left of the road in the edge of the timber, and open (Page 132) fire upon the enemy with shot and shell. Lieutenant-Colonel McNulta, commanding the Ninety-fourth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, was directed to support Lieutenant Ed wards section of artillery in the movement thus ordered. The Lieutenant soon reached a point with his guns from which the enemy were seen drawn up in line about half a mile off, and at ten o clock opened fire upon them. In a few moments the Confederate batteries replied with twelve pieces, and with such energy that General Herron with drew the section of artillery and the Ninety-fourth Illinois Infantry from the advanced position taken up. He saw it would not be prudent to order his troops to cross the stream at the ford, unless he could draw the attention of the Confederate batteries to some other point, as they were posted to command the ford by concentrating the fire of all their guns upon it. His infantry and artillery were rapidly coming up and forming in line, and he deter mined to cross the creek without unnecessarily exposing his troops to an enfilading fire of the Confederate artillery. He made some further examination of the terrain, and found that the stream could be crossed about a half mile be low the regular ford by cutting a road through the timber, and this proposed crossing would enable him to take up a position south of the creek beyond the range of the Con federate batteries.
He therefore ordered Colonel Huston, commanding the second division, to have a sufficient number of men de tailed to cut out the proposed road with as little delay as possible.
The plan of the General was to have one of his batteries cross the creek by the new road, advance to the high open ground on his extreme right, and open fire upon the enemy, hoping to draw the fire of their batteries, so that the artillery of his third division could cross the creek at the regular ford without having to face a storm of shot and shell. The moment the new road was opened, Colonel (Page 133) Huston moved Captain David Murphy’s long-range rifle battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, across to the south side of the creek, and then dividing it into half batteries, placed the left half of three pieces, under Captain Murphy, in a commanding position north of the spring branch on the extreme right; and the right half pieces, under Lieutenant James Marr, in a good position four hundred yards to the left on the south side of the spring branch in front of the Confederate center. The section of the Peoria Battery, Illinois Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Borris, was posted about three hundred yards to the left of Lieutenant Marr, near the Fayetteville road. Colonel William McE. Dye, commanding the second brigade, Second Division, was ordered to support the two batteries, and Colonel John C. Black, commanding the thirty-seventh Illinois Infantry, was directed to move to the right to support the pieces under Captain Murphy. Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Leake, commanding the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, was ordered to support the pieces under Lieutenant Marr on the left.
Col. J. G. Clark, commanding the first brigade, second division, was ordered to occupy with his regiment, the Twenty-sixth Indiana Infantry, a position one hundred yards in the rear of the center of Colonel Dye’s brigade, as a reserve. At twelve o clock the three regiments, following Captain Murphy’s battery, waded the creek and marched to the positions assigned to them. While Colonel Huston was thus moving into position on the right with the troops and artillery of the second division, General Herron was pre paring to cross the creek at the regular ford with the troops and artillery of the third division under the cover of Captain Murphy’s battery.
At twelve-thirty o clock Captain Murphy fired the signal gun, and a moment later the other two pieces, the half-battery under Lieutenant Marr and the section under Lieu tenant Borris, opened fire upon the Confederates, who re plied with twelve pieces with much energy. The moment (Page 134) the signal gun was fired by Captain Murphy’s battery, Colonel W. W. Orme, commanding the second brigade, third division, consisting of the Ninety-fourth Illinois, under Lieutenant-Colonel McNulta, the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel McFarland, and Captain Foust’s battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, moved for ward and crossed the creek at the regular ford, under a heavy fire from the Confederate artillery, and immediately prepared for action.
Colonel Henry Bertram, commanding the first brigade, third division, moved forward with the Twentieth Regiment, Wisconsin Infantry, and Captain Frank Backof’s battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, following close upon the rear of Colonel Orme’s brigade, also received a heavy fire from the Confederate batteries before his command had crossed the creek. The artillery companies of Captains Foust and Backof came to the front on a gallop and went into battery a short distance in the advance of the infantry, on the right and left of the road, and opened fire upon the Confederate batteries and position, and in less than fifteen minutes after his signal gun was fired General Herron had eighteen pieces of artillery on the south side of the creek, playing upon the Confederate position on the ridge, with shot and shell.
This storm of shot and shell sent by his batteries screeching into the Confederate lines, exploding and tearing the timber into splinters, soon brought out all General Hindman’s artillery, consisting of twenty-two pieces.
Tags: General Blunt, General Curtis, General Hindman, Prairie Grove, Second Division, Third Division, Van Buren
Source: The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, By Wiley Britton, published 1922, Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., Kansas City, Missouri.
